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INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits, among other
1
things, discrimination on the basis of national origin. Over the past
several decades, numerous individuals have challenged English-only
language policies by claiming that they are discriminatory and have a
2
disparate impact on certain national origin groups. These individuals argue that English-only policies create a hostile work environment,
which constitutes discrimination with respect to conditions of em3
ployment. Since the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
4
(EEOC) guidelines on national origin discrimination state that the
mere existence of an English-only policy is sufficient to establish a
5
prima facie case of discrimination, bilingual employees rely on these
6
guidelines to establish a claim of disparate impact discrimination.
Under the guidelines, the employees do not have to prove that the
policy has any substantial adverse impact in order to shift the burden
to the employer; they simply must show that the employer has an Eng1

Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2008) (“It shall
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”).
2
See, e.g., Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1298 (10th Cir. 2006) (discussing the legality of Oklahoma City’s English-only policy for employees), abrogated on
other grounds by Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006); Garcia v.
Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing a California meatdistribution company’s English-only policy); cf. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of National Origin, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1606–1606.1 (2008) (defining national origin
discrimination as “the denial of equal employment opportunity because of an individual’s, or his or her ancestor’s, place of origin; or because an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group”).
3
See Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1303 (noting that the plaintiffs alleged that the English-only policy created a work environment “that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment” (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993))).
4
The EEOC is the government agency with enforcement authority over Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as well as all of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Equal
Pay Act of 1963, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, certain sections of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Titles I and V of the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Laws Enforced by the EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/laws.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
5
See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a)–(b) (2008) (declaring that those English-only policies
that apply at all times, including on breaks, should be automatically subjected to strict
scrutiny, whereas policies that only apply to part of the work day should still place the
burden on the employer to show a business-necessity justification).
6
See, e.g., Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1305; EEOC v. Synchro-Start Prods., Inc., 29 F.
Supp. 2d 911, 913 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
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lish-only policy in place to establish the adverse impact. Courts,
however, have been divided on whether to grant deference to these
7
guidelines.
Although national origin claims are not as common as those made
8
under many other Title VII protected class categories, they are likely
to become increasingly important. Immigration is an extremely sali9
ent political topic, and as the number of bilingual employees in the

7

Compare Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1489 (rejecting explicitly the EEOC guidelines),
with Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1305-06 (affording the guidelines some respect, as a form
of guidance), and EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 550, 556
(N.D. Tex. 1999) (giving the guidelines “great deference”).
8
From 1997 through 2007, national origin discrimination charges increased from
being alleged in 8.3% of all EEOC filings to 11.4% of filings. During this same period,
charges of race and sex discrimination have each been present in over 30% of EEOC
charges, and allegations of age and disability discrimination have each been alleged in
approximately 20% of filings. EEOC CHARGE STATISTICS: FY 1997 THROUGH FY 2007
(2008), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last visited Mar. 15,
2009). Importantly, the EEOC calculates the percentage of charges in which a claim of
each type is alleged, rather than the percentage of total claims that each type comprises. Because many charges contain multiple claims, the percentages calculated by
the EEOC can add up to well over 100%. In 1997, for example, there were 80,680
charges brought, though there were 131,967 total claims. Id. The percentages applied
in this Comment are those used by the EEOC, meaning that 5.1% of the charges
brought in 1997 contained at least one allegation of discrimination on the basis of national origin.
9
The immigration issue was repeatedly front-page news in the New York Times over
the late spring and early summer of 2007. See, e.g., Carl Hulse, Kennedy Plea Was Last
Gasp for Immigration Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2007, at A1; Robert Pear & Michael Luo,
Critics in Senate Vowing to Alter Immigration Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2007, at A1; Robert
Pear & Jim Rutenberg, Senators in Bipartisan Deal On Broad Immigration Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
May 18, 2007, at A1. In addition, among Republican voters, the issue consistently
polled as an important issue in the early parts of the 2008 primary elections. See Election Center 2008: Primary Exit Polls, CNN, Jan. 8, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/
ELECTION/2008/primaries/results/epolls/index.html#NHREP (showing that immigration was a close third in the list of most important issues to Republican primary voters in New Hampshire); Election Center 2008: Primary Exit Polls, CNN, Jan. 3, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/primaries/results/epolls/#val=IAREP (noting that the top concern of 33% of Republican caucus-goers in Iowa was immigration).
Although the economy dominated the general election (with 57% of potential voters
deeming it the most important election issue), 5% of likely voters still considered illegal immigration to be the most important issue when deciding how to vote. Election
Center 2008: Election Tracker: Candidate Polling, CNN, Nov. 4, 2008, http://www.cnn.
com/ELECTION/2008/map/polling. Further, one poll in late October 2008 found
that 26% of U.S. voters were “angry about the current immigration situation,” and 74%
thought that the government was “not doing enough to secure the nation’s borders.”
26% Angry About Immigration, The Issue Candidates Ignore, RASMUSSEN REPORTS, Oct.
23, 2008, http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/
immigration/26_angry_about_immigration_the_issue_candidates_ignore. Given that
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country continues to expand, the legality of English-only policies will
10
continue to gain importance. In addition, committees in both the
Senate and the House are considering amendments to Title VII, including proposals specifically targeted to “[p]rovide relief for workers,
regardless of immigration status, who are victims of labor and em11
ployment law violations.” Such bills would only further increase the
reach of Title VII to bilingual employees and reaffirm the topic’s
growing importance. In light of the disagreement between circuit
courts in their national-origin-discrimination jurisprudence and the
likelihood of a continued increase in such complaints, it is time for
the Supreme Court to determine both the scope of national origin
discrimination under Title VII as well as the level of deference that is
due to the EEOC guidelines on the subject.
This Comment focuses specifically on the application of the
EEOC guidelines to bilingual employees, as it is in these cases that
plaintiffs rely most heavily on the guidelines to demonstrate an adverse impact. Part I examines the jurisprudence of national origin discrimination against bilingual speakers. Part II then addresses the level
of deference due the EEOC guidelines under standard administrative
law. Finally, Part III analyzes the advantages of following the EEOC
guidelines from both a theoretical and a practical standpoint, and it
compares the treatment of national origin discrimination claims to
those of race and sex discrimination. The EEOC guidelines represent
a thoughtful and well-reasoned approach to national origin discrimination and should receive the standard deference granted to interpretative rules issued by administrative agencies.

the immigration issue was not resolved, Congress will almost inevitably revisit the topic
in the coming years.
10
See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 13-I, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/
docs/national-origin.html (citing the statistic that 38% of new jobs were filled by immigrants between 1990 and 1998 and declaring that “[a]s the composition of the
American workforce continues to change, Title VII’s prohibition against national origin discrimination has become increasingly significant in ensuring equality in employment opportunities”). In addition, there is evidence that English-only policies
themselves are becoming more important, as the number of policy-related suits filed
increased from 30 in 1996 to over 120 in 2006. Tresa Baldas, English-Only Workplace
Policies Trigger Lawsuits, NAT’L L.J., June 18, 2007, available at http://www.law.com/
jsp/ihc/PubArticleIHC.jsp?id=1182194749541.
11
Press Release, Senator Benjamin L. Cardin, Cardin and Mikulski Co-Sponsor
Civil Rights Act of 2008 ( Jan. 25, 2008) (on file with author); see also S. 2554, 110th Cong.
(2008); H.R. 5129, 110th Cong. (2008) (stating that the purpose of the bill itself was “[t]o
restore, reaffirm, and reconcile legal rights and remedies under civil rights statutes”).
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF ENGLISH-ONLY JURISPRUDENCE:
FROM GLOOR TO MALDONADO
Workplace discrimination under Title VII can take two forms:
12
disparate treatment or disparate impact. Disparate treatment is generally thought of as the more standard, straightforward type of discrimination; a showing of disparate treatment requires the plaintiff to
demonstrate that there has been unequal treatment (uneven pay or
different conditions of employment, for example) that is based on
13
protected-class status (race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
In disparate treatment cases, it is necessary to prove that the employer
14
acted with a discriminatory animus.
Most cases that challenge English-only language policies, however,
are disparate impact cases. To establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show that a seemingly neutral policy or practice has a signifi15
cant adverse impact on a protected class of employees. If the plaintiff makes that showing, the burden is shifted to the employer to
16
demonstrate a business necessity for the alleged practice.
Importantly, under the disparate impact theory it is not necessary to prove
17
that the employer intended the discriminatory impact.
The major federal circuit court cases dealing with English-only
policies—and the district courts’ application of these decisions—were
decided over a period of several decades, and they are interspersed
with the issuance of the EEOC guidelines and congressional amendments to Title VII. Overall, courts range in their treatment of the
guidelines from those that have held that the guidelines deserve no
18
deference to those that have held that they must receive “great def-

12

Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1484 (“Thus, a plaintiff alleging discrimination under
Title VII may proceed under two theories of liability: disparate treatment or disparate
impact.”).
13
See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (listing the
four elements that a plaintiff must prove to establish a prima facie case of a failure-tohire claim under Title VII).
14
See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1484 (requiring discriminatory intent in disparate
treatment cases).
15
Id. at 1486.
16
Id.
17
See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 988 (1988) (stating that
“some facially neutral employment practices may violate Title VII even in the absence
of a demonstrated discriminatory intent”).
18
See, e.g., Kania v. Archdiocese of Phila., 14 F. Supp. 2d 730, 735 (E.D. Pa. 1998)
(“[T]he EEOC Guidelines must be disregarded.”).
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19

erence.” A brief chronological summary of the evolution of the English-only jurisprudence is helpful in shedding light on the issues that
courts face today.
A. Gloor and the EEOC Guidelines
In 1980, the Fifth Circuit became the first federal appellate court
to address the issue of English-only policies and national origin discrimination, and it did so in the context of a disparate treatment
20
claim. In Garcia v. Gloor, the court addressed whether national origin discrimination was broad enough to encompass language dis21
crimination such as English-only policies in the workplace. Garcia,
who was fluent in both English and Spanish, worked at Gloor Lumber
22
and Supply, Inc., in Texas. As an employee, he was subject to a rule
23
against speaking Spanish unless with a Spanish-speaking customer.
When asked a question by a fellow employee, Garcia responded in
Spanish in the presence of a company officer, and was subsequently
24
discharged. Garcia claimed that his language was a defining characteristic of his national origin, so that being denied the right to speak
in his preferred language qualified as discrimination on the basis of
25
his national origin.
The Fifth Circuit rejected Garcia’s argument, asserting that
“[n]either the statute nor common understanding equates national
origin with the language that one chooses to speak. Language may be
used as a covert basis for national origin discrimination, but the English-only rule was not applied to Garcia by Gloor either to this end or
26
with this result.” While the Gloor court did leave open the possibility
that language could be used as a proxy for national origin, and therefore that policies dealing with language could violate Title VII, it did

19

EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs., Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 550, 556 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980).
21
Id. at 268.
22
Id. at 266.
23
See id. (detailing the English-only rule and noting that it did not apply to those
who worked in the lumber yard or to any employee during his or her break).
24
See id. at 266-67 (noting that although Garcia was discharged following this particular incident, the employer alleged other violations of this and other policies to justify the firing).
25
See id. at 267 (“An expert witness called by the plaintiff testified that the Spanish
language is the most important aspect of ethnic identification for Mexican-Americans,
and it is to them what skin color is to others.”).
26
Id. at 268.
20

2009] National Origin Discrimination and the EEOC Guidelines

1519

not believe that any such policy automatically had the adverse impact
27
required to establish a national origin discrimination claim. Since
Garcia had not shown that the language policy was intended to eliminate members of a certain national origin from the workplace, he did
not establish the discriminatory animus necessary to maintain his dis28
parate treatment claim.
The EEOC responded to Gloor by issuing guidelines on the topic
29
of national origin discrimination on December 29, 1980. Although
not complying exactly with the Administrative Procedure Act, the
EEOC generally followed formal notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures in adopting these guidelines, receiving over 250 public
30
comments. Two sections of the guidelines in particular are noteworthy. First, in section 1606.1, the EEOC stated that “[t]he Commission
defines national origin discrimination broadly as including, but not
limited to, the denial of equal employment opportunity because of an
individual’s, or his or her ancestor’s, place of origin; or because an
individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a na31
tional origin group.” This section directly responded to the decision
in Gloor and makes clear that “national origin discrimination” covers
discrimination on the basis of language. The second important section is 1606.7, which specifically addresses “Speak-English-Only” rules.
Under this provision, if the rule only applies to part of the sphere of
employment, the presence of the language policy will shift the burden
32
and require the employer to show a business necessity for the policy.
If, however, the rule applies at all times, including on breaks, courts
33
should presume that the policy is burdensome and scrutinize it closely.
When these sections are read together, they set forth a much
more stringent standard for language policies and national origin discrimination than did the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Gloor. Under the
EEOC guidelines, any employer who wants to implement a language
policy could be required to provide a business justification for doing
27

Id. at 270.
Id. at 272.
29
29 C.F.R. § 1606 (2008).
30
See Michael Patterson, Note, Garcia v. Spun Steak Company: English-Only Rules
in the Workplace, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277, 287 (1995) (“The Commission carefully solicited
comments from federal entities and the public at large to assure that the process included ‘interested persons’ in ‘all stages of [the] rulemaking process.’” (alteration in
original) (internal citations omitted)).
31
29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (emphasis added).
32
Id. § 1606.7(b).
33
Id. § 1606.7(a).
28
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so, even without the plaintiff’s proving that the language was being
used as a proxy for national origin (for a disparate treatment case) or
that the specific policy at issue has a significant adverse impact on the
group (for a disparate impact case).
B. The 1991 Amendments and Garcia v. Spun Steak
In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to address several cases that
had been decided by the Supreme Court following the Civil Rights Act
34
of 1964.
Most notably, these amendments required that the employer bear the burden of proving that the alleged discriminatory
conduct was justified by a business necessity, and they created a provi35
sion for monetary damages in sexual harassment cases.
Although
discussed during the Senate hearings, the amendments did not alter
the portions of the Civil Rights Act that specifically address national
36
origin discrimination.
Following these amendments, the Ninth Circuit became the second federal appellate court to address the issue of English-only policies in the workplace, but the first to do so since the EEOC had issued
37
its guidelines. The plaintiffs in Garcia v. Spun Steak were bilingual
38
employees who worked in a meat-packaging factory. After Englishspeaking employees complained that they were being harassed in
Spanish by their co-workers, the company instituted an English-only
39
policy for all work-related activities. Following the implementation

34

See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(II), at 23-32 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549
(declaring that one of the main functions of the amendments was to overturn Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)); see also Steinle v. Boeing Co., 785 F.
Supp. 1434, 1436 n.3 (D. Kan. 1992) (stating that the purpose of the 1991 amendments was to overturn various provisions of the following: EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991); W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755
(1989); Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989); Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at
642; and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)). The provisions that were
overturned generally involved issues of when damages were recoverable and what burdens would be borne by which party throughout the litigation.
35
H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(II).
36
The fact that these sections were discussed during debate has an important bearing on the level of deference due the EEOC guidelines. See infra subsection II.B.2.
37
Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993).
38
Id. at 1483.
39
See id. (“[I]t is hereafter the policy of this Company that only English will be
spoken in connection with work. During lunch, breaks, and employees’ own time,
they are obviously free to speak Spanish if they wish. However, we urge all of you not
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of the policy, the plaintiffs sued, alleging that the English-only policy
violated Title VII because it had a disparate impact on Spanish40
speaking employees.
The Ninth Circuit held that adopting an English-only language
41
policy was neither violative of Title VII as a matter of law, nor on the
42
facts pled in the specific case. Of more interest, however, was the
court’s refusal to shift the burden to the employer and require it to
show a business necessity for the policy upon a demonstration that an
43
English-only rule was in place. In leaving this burden with the plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit explicitly declined to follow the EEOC guide44
lines. The court, however, went further than merely refusing to apply the guidelines; it claimed that there was a “compelling indication”
that the EEOC’s interpretation was wrong and contrary to the plain
45
language of the statute.
Since the court did not apply the EEOC guidelines, it was required to determine if the plaintiffs had demonstrated a substantial
adverse impact. The court concluded that they had not, since the
46
plaintiffs were bilingual and could have chosen to speak English.
Without a showing of an adverse impact, the plaintiffs failed to present a prima facie case of national origin discrimination, and the em47
ployer was not required to show a business necessity for the policy.
Under the Ninth Circuit’s decision not to follow the EEOC guidelines,
employers would seemingly never be required to show a business justification for an English-only policy in a disparate impact case brought
by bilingual employees, as these individuals could always choose to
avoid the policy’s consequences by speaking in English.

to use your fluency in Spanish in a fashion which may lead other employees to suffer
humiliation.” (alteration in original)).
40
See id. at 1483-84 (noting that the suit was filed as a class action on behalf of all
Spanish-speaking employees at the plant).
41
See id. at 1489 (arguing that questions of a hostile work environment are inherently fact specific and are not conducive to a per se rule).
42
Id. at 1490.
43
See id. at 1489 (claiming that the existence of an English-only policy “does not
inexorably lead to an abusive environment”).
44
See id. (“[W]e reach a conclusion opposite to the EEOC’s long standing position. . . . We do not reject the English-only rule Guideline lightly. . . . But we are not
bound by the Guidelines.”).
45
See id. at 1490 (emphasizing Congress’s desire to balance the need to eliminate
discrimination against its attempt to respect the independence of the employer).
46
Id. at 1489.
47
Id. at 1490.
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C. Maldonado v. City of Altus
Most recently, in 2006, the Tenth Circuit addressed language restrictions and national origin discrimination in Maldonado v. City of Al48
tus. In this case, the city of Altus implemented an English-only policy
for all of its employees for “all work related and business communica49
tions during the work day.” Among the plaintiffs’ allegations was the
contention that this policy created a hostile work environment for
50
Hispanic employees.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for the defendants on both the disparate impact and the
51
disparate treatment claims. While the court did not definitively rule
on the legal question of the amount of deference due to the EEOC
guidelines (since in order to reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment it was only required to determine that a rational juror
52
could have found for the plaintiffs), the court did note that the
53
EEOC guidelines were persuasive. The court also rested its decision
54
largely upon these guidelines. Although it still was not willing to endorse wholeheartedly the EEOC guidelines, the Tenth Circuit clearly
believed that an English-only policy could constitute national origin
discrimination and that the EEOC guidelines provided at least persuasive evidence for the court to consider.
D. District Court Decisions Since Spun Steak
Since the decision in Garcia v. Spun Steak, eleven district court decisions have addressed whether English-only language policies constitute national origin discrimination against bilingual employees.

48

433 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington N. &
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
49
Maldonado, 433 F.3d at 1299 (emphasis omitted).
50
See id. at 1301 (detailing the reasons that the employees considered the policy to
create a hostile work environment and reviewing plaintiffs’ affidavits about their experiences under the policy).
51
Id. at 1316.
52
Id. at 1305.
53
See id. at 1306 (“We believe that [the EEOC’s] conclusions are entitled to respect, not as interpretations of the governing law, but as an indication of what a reasonable, informed person may think about the impact of an English-only work rule on
minority employees, even if we might not draw the same inference.”).
54
See id. at 1306-08 (concluding that a reasonable juror could find both that the
plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of discrimination and that the defendant’s
business justification was inadequate).
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These cases can be grouped into three broad categories. The first
group of cases finds that an English-only policy did not have an adverse impact on bilingual employees, but it does not address the relevance of, or level of deference due, the EEOC guidelines. The second
category consists of those cases that recognize that an English-only
policy can have an adverse impact on bilingual speakers, but that refuse to give deference to the EEOC guidelines in establishing that adverse impact. Finally, there is a series of cases that explicitly relies on
the EEOC guidelines as establishing that English-only policies have an
adverse impact, even on bilingual employees. A brief overview of
these cases will help flesh out how courts are grappling with the guidelines and the effect that these guidelines have on case outcomes.
Only two cases have completely rejected the possibility that an
English-only policy could have an adverse impact on bilingual em55
ployees. Prado v. L. Luria & Son, Inc. was the first case decided by a
district court following Spun Steak, and it relied heavily on Gloor. The
court claimed that English-only rules as applied to bilingual employees did not violate Title VII since the rules had no adverse impact on
56
those employees. The court, however, did not address the level of
deference due the EEOC guidelines. Instead, it found that the employer had successfully shown a business necessity for the practice and
that it therefore would have prevailed even if the EEOC guidelines
57
had applied and automatically shifted the burden.
More recently, in Navarette v. Nike Inc., the District of Oregon also
failed to reach the question of deference due the EEOC guidelines
since it found that “the Ninth Circuit has held English-only policies
similar to that used by Defendant were not discriminatory and did not
58
violate Title VII with regard to bilingual employees.” Therefore, in
both of the district court decisions that categorically deny any adverse
impact of an English-only policy on bilingual employees, the courts relied
on circuit court precedent and did not analyze the issue independently.
Unconstrained by a prior circuit court ruling, several other district
courts considered anew whether English-only policies could constitute
national origin discrimination against bilingual employees but refused
to give deference to the EEOC guidelines. The first such case was

55

975 F. Supp. 1349 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
Id. at 1354.
57
Id.
58
No. 05-1827, 2007 WL 2890976, at *7 (D. Or. Sept. 28, 2007) (citing Garcia v.
Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993)).
56
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59

Kania v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia.
There, the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania did not go so far as to say that English-only rules applied
to bilingual employees cannot be discriminatory under Title VII, but it
held that the church’s English-only policy, as applied to the plaintiff,
60
was not national origin discrimination. Further, the court noted that
the EEOC guidelines should be entirely disregarded as being beyond
the scope of the Commission’s authority since the guidelines altered
61
the burden-shifting formula found in the Civil Rights Act. While not
making such an extreme statement, this was also the position taken by
62
a District of Massachusetts judge in Cosme v. Salvation Army.
That
63
court emphasized that it was not bound by the EEOC guidelines, but
it still gave them some consideration, finding that the guidelines were
64
not overly prejudicial to employers. After some analysis, however,
the court found that the English-only policy at issue in that case was
65
not discriminatory. While these two cases and the others in this cate66
gory do not definitively close the door on the possibility of bilingual
employees successfully bringing suit for national origin discrimination
if they are subject to an English-only policy, it can be extremely difficult for them to demonstrate an adverse impact since these courts refuse to defer to the EEOC guidelines.
The third group of district courts has relied explicitly upon the
EEOC guidelines in adjudicating national origin discrimination
claims, finding that English-only policies have an adverse impact on
bilingual employees. The Northern District of Illinois was the first to
67
do so in EEOC v. Synchro-Start Products, Inc. This court declared that

59

14 F. Supp. 2d 730 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
Id. at 736.
61
Id. at 735.
62
284 F. Supp. 2d. 229 (D. Mass. 2003).
63
See id. at 240 (stating that the EEOC guidelines offer guidance but are not binding).
64
See id. (noting that the presence of an English-only policy does not always result
in a successful claim for the plaintiff).
65
Id.
66
The lines of analysis presented in Kania and Cosme are representative of the
cases found in this category. See Velasquez v. Goldwater Mem’l Hosp., 88 F. Supp. 2d
257, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (following a similar line of analysis as Kania and finding that
if the EEOC guidelines were read to provide a “presumption of discrimination,” they
would conflict with the plain meaning of the statute and would therefore be invalid);
Tran v. Standard Motor Prods., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1210-11 (D. Kan. 1998)
(holding, prior to Maldonado, that the EEOC guidelines could provide guidance, but
implicitly ignoring them by not finding an adverse impact despite the presence of an
English-only policy—much as the court did in Cosme).
67
29 F. Supp. 2d 911 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
60
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it “find[s] it possible to impose liability . . . perhaps even as to those
bilingual employees who can ‘readily comply with the English-only
68
rule and still enjoy the privilege of speaking on the job.’” Further,
the court stated that it was obliged to give “substantial weight” to the
EEOC’s findings that English-only policies by themselves are enough
69
to establish a substantial adverse impact.
Shortly afterwards, the
Northern District of Texas decided EEOC v. Premier Operator Services,
70
Inc. That court found that English-only policies constituted national
origin discrimination since they had a disparate impact on Spanishspeaking employees, preventing them from speaking in the language
with which they were most comfortable and placing bilingual employ71
ees at a disproportionate risk of punishment. In addition, this court
went even further than the Illinois court in claiming that the EEOC
72
guidelines deserved “great deference.” Decisions such as these affirmatively accept and apply the EEOC guidelines to bilingual em73
ployees claiming national origin discrimination.
Other courts in the third category have been willing to use the
guidelines but have been less enthusiastic in their support of them.
For example, the Eastern District of New York, in Gonzalo v. All Island
74
Transportation, “assume[d] without deciding”—since the employer’s
adequate business justification prevented the burden shifting from be75
ing dispositive—that the EEOC guidelines would apply. While cases
like Gonzalo do fall within the third category—as they both read Title
VII to allow for national origin discrimination claims based on English-only policies and grant at least some deference to the EEOC
guidelines—they are extremely different from those that actively advocate deference to the national origin guidelines.
Given the range of results and paths of analysis followed by the
district courts in the wake of Spun Steak and Maldonado, clarity is nec-

68

Id. at 913 (quoting Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480, 1487 (9th Cir. 1993)).
Id.
70
75 F. Supp. 2d 550 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
71
Id. at 558.
72
Id. at 556.
73
See, e.g., EEOC v. Sephora USA, LLC, 419 F. Supp. 2d 408, 414, 416-17 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (applying the EEOC guidelines to establish the English-only policy’s adverse impact and the prima facie case of national origin discrimination, but finding that facilitating “communications with customers” was a sufficient business justification to allow the policy).
74
No. 04-3452, 2007 WL 642959 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2007).
75
Id. at *2. The court in Barber v. Lovelace Sandia Health Systems, 409 F. Supp. 2d
1313, 1337-38 (D.N.M. 2005), also took this approach.
69
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essary. Such clarity, however, need not wait for a ruling from the Supreme Court. The field of administrative law has already addressed
many of the questions raised by the interpretation of the EEOC guidelines, and it is to this that we now turn.
II. EXPLORING THE FRAMEWORK OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In determining whether or not to grant deference to the EEOC
guidelines, courts are not writing on a blank slate. Rather, they are
addressing these guidelines in the context of administrative law. In
order to understand the courts’ decisions, it is thus necessary to provide a brief overview of how these guidelines fit into the framework of
76
administrative law.
A. The Powerful Impact of Rules
Courts have generally granted wide berth for agencies to issue
rules. In SEC v. Chenery Corp., the Supreme Court established that an
agency is entitled to decide whether it will proceed with ad hoc adju77
dications or truncate the process by issuing a rule. The court upheld
and revisited this decision, in a slightly different context, in Heckler v.
78
Campbell. There, the Supreme Court reiterated that rulemaking was
an acceptable practice—even for agencies with primarily adjudicatory
authority—and emphasized that there did not need to be an individ-

76

Some scholars have questioned whether courts treat rules and regulations issuing from the EEOC as altogether different from those promulgated by other agencies.
See generally Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 1937 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court grants less deference
to EEOC determinations than it does to other agencies because of a lack of faith that
the EEOC is composed of experts on the subject and because of suspicions about the
agency’s agenda). This Comment does not attempt such an objective explanation of
federal jurisprudence on the subject, but rather makes a normative legal argument as
to why the courts should not treat EEOC guidelines—and more specifically its guidelines on English-only language policies—differently from how it treats regulations from
other agencies or even other guidelines issued by the EEOC itself.
77
See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (“[T]he choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”); see also Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 896 (2d Cir. 1960) (upholding the FAA’s
authority to issue a rule, even if it results in the deprivation of property without an individual adjudication, and noting that it is not required that every individual affected
by the rule have a voice in its adoption).
78
461 U.S. 458 (1983).
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79

ual determination in each case that came before an agency. Therefore, in choosing to adopt and apply its guidelines rather than determine the impact of English-only rules on a case-by-case basis, the
EEOC was on solid legal ground.
The decision to issue a rule, however, can have a powerful impact—one that can be seen very clearly in the case of the EEOC guidelines. When these guidelines are followed, courts apply the agency’s
rule—rather than the statute—directly to the conduct to determine
80
whether there is an adverse impact. In the context of national origin
discrimination, if the EEOC’s guidelines are followed, the employee
need only show that there is an English-only policy; she need not show
that the English-only policy constitutes a substantial adverse impact.
Demonstrating the presence of an English-only policy would truncate
the analysis by automatically establishing a substantial adverse impact,
and it would shift the burden to the employer to establish a legitimate
business necessity for the practice.
The variation between the Ninth Circuit’s and the Tenth Circuit’s
analyses shows the difference in outcome that this seemingly minor
change can have, especially for bilingual employees. The Ninth Circuit declined to find any substantial adverse impact resulting from the
English-only policy, noting that the employees could comply with the
81
policy because they were bilingual. The Tenth Circuit, on the other
hand, relied on the expertise of the EEOC to establish that every English-only policy has a substantial adverse impact. By doing so, it bypassed the question of whether an employee’s ability to comply with
an English-only rule prevented that rule from having an adverse im82
pact.
The burden was then shifted to the employer, immediately
placing the plaintiff in a better position. The decision, therefore, of
whether or not to treat the EEOC guidelines as a rule that the courts
will follow has a significant impact on the trajectory of the case. This
fact was recognized by the court in Kania, which declared that
79

See id. at 467 (claiming that although the statutory scheme anticipated individualized adjudications, there was no reason to relitigate classes of claims that did not require case-by-case attention, and thereby allowing the agency to supplement its adjudicatory power with rulemaking authority).
80
See, e.g., EEOC v. Synchro-Start Prods., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911, 913-14 (N.D. Ill.
1999) (noting that the EEOC guidelines create an inference that English-only policies
have an adverse impact and that this inference by itself would be sufficient to carry a discrimination claim if the employer did not advance a business justification for the policy).
81
Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993).
82
Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1305-06 (10th Cir. 2006), abrogated on
other grounds by Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
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“[w]ithout the leverage provided by the EEOC Guidelines, Kania’s
claim that the English-only rule amounted to national origin discrimi83
nation, as applied to her, quickly collapses.”
B. The Level of Deference Due to Agency Rules
Not all rules deserve the same amount of deference under administrative law principles. The Supreme Court has recognized that certain standards of thoughtfulness and consistency can lead to increased
84
deference. In addition, the legislative history of an act can lend sub85
stantial support to an agency’s interpretation of the statute. Finally,
courts have consistently granted deference to informal guidelines issued by other agencies even when they were issued following less for86
mal processes than those used by the EEOC.
1. Deference Required by Supreme Court Precedent
Depending on their characteristics, individual rules issued by
87
agencies receive different levels of deference from the courts. Un88
der EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., when determining the degree
of deference to give to an agency’s rule, the court should examine the
thoroughness of consideration that the agency gave to the topic before issuing the rule, the validity of the agency’s rationale behind the

83

Kania v. Archdiocese of Phila., 14 F. Supp. 2d 730, 736 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991).
85
See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 552-53 (1979) (using legislative
history and consistent administrative interpretation of the statute in question to support the agency’s deteriminations).
86
See, e.g., Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995) (granting deference to Bureau of
Prisons’s regulations).
87
As described by one court,
84

[D]eference is a legal concept that allocates roles between one adjudicating
tribunal and another. For example, because an agency or a trial court may be
better suited to make factual findings, a reviewing tribunal may sustain those
factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, unsupported by substantial
evidence, or the like. . . . Notions of deference are governed by standards of
review and should not be confused with presumptions and other like procedural devices.
Universal Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 488, 493 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Chevron deference, which requires that a court uphold an agency’s interpretation of its organic
statute so long as the statute is ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is a “permissible construction of the statute,” is the highest form of deference for agency determinations. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
88
499 U.S. 244.
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rule, and the rule’s consistency with prior agency adjudications as well
89
as the uniform application of the rule following its implementation.
The EEOC guidelines on national origin discrimination deserve
deference since they satisfy all three factors of the Arabian American Oil
test. On the first prong, although the guidelines are not official legislative rules, there was an extensive public-comment process. The
EEOC solicited public comment before issuing its rule and received
90
approximately 250 comments. This process was certainly sufficient
to ensure that the guidelines were not issued in a capricious manner
but instead were the product of a careful and deliberative process that
culminated in the issuance of guidelines. In addition, the middle
prong—the rationale behind the Commission’s guidelines—is also satisfied, as will be discussed in Section III.A. Finally, the guidelines easily meet the third prong of the Arabian American Oil test: the policy
for dealing with English-only rules has been consistently applied since
1970, even before the interpretation was codified in sections 1606.1
91
and 1606.7. These guidelines were issued promptly after the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in Gloor, which attempted to remove language characteristics from national origin discrimination, and neither section has
been amended or been subject to a revised interpretation since their
92
issuance. The guidelines represent the expert opinion of the agency
for over thirty-five years, and the EEOC has continued to hold this interpretation as it observes the guidelines working in practice. The
EEOC’s guidelines on national origin discrimination meet all three
criteria set forth in Arabian American Oil, confirming that they deserve
deference from the courts.
Additional Supreme Court precedent offers further support for
granting deference to the EEOC guidelines. In United States v. Rutherford, the Court made clear that if Congress is aware of the agency’s interpretation of a statute and subsequently amends the statute without
amending the specific portion at issue, the Court will interpret that
93
action as tacit congressional approval of the agency’s reading.
In
89

See id. at 257 (setting forth the three-prong approach and citing General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-46 (1976), and Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 140 (1944)).
90
Patterson, supra note 30, at 287.
91
Id. at 287-88 & n.72.
92
Cf. Natalie Prescott, Employers on the Fence: A Guide to the Immigratory Workplace, 29
CAMPBELL L. REV. 181, 193-94 (2007) (decrying the fact that the EEOC continues to
consider language characteristics a part of national origin).
93
See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 552-54 (1979) (asserting that the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is meant to have jurisdiction over drugs for the
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that case, the Court determined that the FDA’s determination that it
was authorized to regulate drugs for terminally ill patients under the
94
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act deserved “substantial deference.”
This deference was further reinforced by the congressional history,
which showed a clear congressional intent to leave the agency’s inter95
pretation in place. The Court supported this deference largely with
appeals to separation-of-powers concerns and with respect for both
96
the executive and legislative branches.
These considerations add credence to the belief that Congress intended courts to apply Title VII consistently with the EEOC’s guidelines. When Congress amended Title VII in 1991, it was conscious of
the EEOC guidelines, but it did not touch the portions dealing with
97
national origin discrimination. Furthermore, Congress did not simply tacitly approve the interpretation, but specifically addressed the
guidelines in discussing the amendments. Two exchanges between
Senators Dennis DeConcini and Edward Kennedy illustrate this point.
In the first, the Senators agreed that national origin discrimination
included “discrimination based upon characteristics common to a specific ethnic group, such as ancestry, culture, linguistic characteristics—
including language and speech accent—physical characteristics, and
98
birthplace.” In their second exchange, they agreed that the EEOC
guidelines provided a “sound and effective method” for dealing with
the problem of English-only language policies and that the amendments would not “in any way adversely affect the EEOC regulation on
99
language use in the workplace.” With such a record, it is difficult to
argue that Congress did not intend Title VII to be consistent with the

terminally ill since Committee Reports for the 1962 Amendments to the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act “note with approval” that it is current FDA policy to do so and the
Amendments did not seek to change this practice); cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574, 600-01 (1983) (finding that where Congress is aware of an
agency’s interpretation of a statute, a failure to amend that portion of the statute provides support for the agency’s interpretation).
94
Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 553 (citing Bd. of Governors of FRS v. First Lincolnwood
Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 248 (1978), and Bayside Enters., Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298, 304
(1977)).
95
See id. at 554 (“Such deference is particularly appropriate where, as here, an
agency’s interpretation involves issues of considerable public controversy, and Congress has not acted to correct any misperception of its statutory objectives.”).
96
See id. (noting the Court’s hesitation to go against both clear congressional intent and the interpretation of the administrative agency).
97
See supra Section I.B (discussing the 1991 amendments).
98
137 CONG. REC. 29,051 (1991) (emphasis added).
99
Id.
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EEOC guidelines. This shows that, at least following the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act, the EEOC guidelines were clearly in line
with congressional intent. Because of this difficulty, and because the
guidelines were thoughtfully developed and consistently applied,
Rutherford and other Supreme Court precedent require that courts
give the EEOC guidelines at least some deference.
2. Deference Required by Analogy
The EEOC guidelines at issue are not standard legislative rules issued by agencies; rather, they are more analogous to interpretative
100
rules that explain how an agency intends to apply its organic statute.
Courts, however, have given similar deference to regulations issued by
other agencies even when the regulations are less formal than those
issued by the EEOC. In both Reno v. Koray and Grassi v. Hood, for example, the courts determined that the Bureau of Prisons’s program
101
statements deserved “some deference.”
In Grassi, in particular, the
program statement was very analogous to the EEOC guidelines at issue here. There, the Bureau had listed offenses that were not consid102
ered “nonviolent” when evaluating a prisoner for early release.
Such a ruling truncates the adjudicative process in a manner similar to
the EEOC guidelines: by defining a potentially vague statutory term,
such as “nonviolent” or “significant adverse impact,” the focus is
shifted to the factual existence of a conviction or an English-only policy, rather than to whether or not the conduct at issue falls within the
statutory term. Furthermore, the Bureau of Prisons’s regulations are
less formal than the EEOC guidelines, as the Bureau did not undertake the notice-and-comment process that preceded the adoption of
103
section 1606.
Given that courts have granted “some deference” to the Bureau of
Prisons’s less formal interpretative rules, it is difficult to find justification for granting no deference to the EEOC’s guidelines. This stance
was recognized by the First Circuit in Arnold v. UPS, Inc., in which the
court claimed that EEOC guidelines in general “constitute a body of

100

Black’s Law Dictionary defines an interpretative rule as “[a]n administrative rule
explaining an agency’s interpretation of a statute.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 838 (8th
ed. 2004).
101
Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995); Grassi v. Hood, 251 F.3d 1218, 1220 (9th
Cir. 2001), amended on reh’g en banc, 260 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2001).
102
Grassi, 251 F.3d at 1220.
103
E.g., Reno, 515 U.S. at 61.

1532

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 157: 1513

experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
104
properly resort for guidance.”
The court concluded that the guidelines on disability discrimination “deserve at least as much consideration as a mere ‘internal agency guideline,’ which the Supreme Court
has held is entitled to ‘some deference’ as long as it is a permissible
105
construction of the statute.”
From both the case law and the treatment of similar guidelines issued by other agencies, a strong argument exists for at least granting
some deference to the EEOC guidelines on national origin discrimination. The guidelines were tacitly approved by Congress when it
amended the Civil Rights Act in 1991, were issued following a relatively formal process, are supported by a valid rationale, and have enjoyed consistent application since their inception. Finally, the courts
have repeatedly granted deference to interpretative rules, including
analogous provisions promulgated by the Bureau of Prisons, even
though they are significantly less formal than the EEOC guidelines.
III. THE WISDOM OF THE EEOC GUIDELINES:
POLICY AND PRACTICE
In examining the rationale behind the EEOC’s approach, it is
necessary to look at both the policy reasons for following the guidelines and the practical effects that the approach has had. Further, it is
helpful to compare the treatment of national-origin-discrimination
claims to those based on race and sex, as these are the most frequently
litigated portions of Title VII and the courts have had a full opportu106
nity to consider the EEOC guidelines on those subjects. After examining each of these issues, it is clear that the guidelines are well supported and should be followed.

104

136 F.3d 854, 864 (1st Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), and Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555
(1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
105
Arnold, 136 F.3d at 864 (citing Reno, 515 U.S. at 61). But see Sicard v. City of
Sioux City, 950 F. Supp. 1420, 1434 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (claiming that “courts have the
discretion to substitute their own judgment” for that of the agency when examining interpretative rules).
106
See supra note 8 (noting that race and sex discrimination claims each were alleged in approximately thirty percent of charges brought under Title VII between 1997
and 2007).
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A. Following the EEOC Guidelines Is Both Practical and Good Policy
Beyond the precedential reasons for granting deference to the
EEOC guidelines, there are strong policy reasons for doing so. First,
most cases that raise national-origin-discrimination claims in response
to an English-only policy are likely to be disparate impact cases, since
the policy will apply to all employees but will only have an adverse effect on some. In this type of case, the employee is not required to
107
show that the policy was motivated by discriminatory intent.
Because of this lower burden, the conduct at issue could be suitably
regulated by a blanket rule: it is the policy itself, and not its implementation (unless the claim becomes one of disparate treatment),
that is discriminatory, and policies that have a disparate impact in one
setting are likely to have the same effect as those in another setting.
Further, if the disparate impact that results is the creation of a hostile
work environment, as is often the case with English-only policies,
there is frequently little concrete proof as to how the policy affects
108
working conditions.
In situations such as these, it might be more
appropriate to deal with the issue through a general rule rather than
with a case-by-case analysis that hinges on how well the employee tells
a tragic story, how visible the employee’s distress is from the policy, or
how sympathetic the jury is to this particular plaintiff. Issuing a uniform guideline to address English-only policies is a sensible solution
that will allow for both clarity and uniformity in application.
Not only is the topic of English-only policies generally well suited
to an interpretative rule, but the specific rule itself is also supported
by a valid rationale. The EEOC strongly believes that English-only
language policies always have a substantial adverse impact on those
who speak other languages. Reasons supporting this belief include
the following: English-only policies may “create an atmosphere of in-

107
108

See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
In his dissent in Spun Steak, Judge Boochever noted that

proof of [an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimidation caused by]
English-only rules requires analysis of subjective factors. It is hard to envision
how the burden of proving such an effect would be met other than by conclusory self-serving statements of the Spanish-speaking employees or possibly by
expert testimony of psychologists. The difficulty of meeting such a burden
may well have been one of the reasons for the promulgation of the [EEOC]
guideline. On the other hand, it should not be difficult for an employer to
give specific reasons for the policy . . . .
Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 988 F.2d 1480, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993) (Boochever, J., dissenting).
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feriority, isolation and intimidation based on national origin”; these
policies inherently treat bilingual speakers differently by preventing
them from speaking in the language of their choice; these rules can
create barriers to employment for those with limited English-language
skills; these rules can prevent employees from speaking in the lan110
guage in which they can most effectively communicate; and there is
111
a disproportionate risk of punishment for bilingual speakers.
The
policies, in other words, not only create a hostile work environment
but also have potential side effects that fall solely on those who speak
languages other than English, subjecting them to different terms and
conditions of employment than those employees who speak only English. All the reasons offered by the EEOC could be used by individual
plaintiffs to establish that they have suffered a substantial adverse impact, but when brought before different judges they might meet with
varying levels of success. As a body with special expertise on the subject, the EEOC issued its national origin guidelines to ensure that
these adverse impacts were recognized and adequately addressed by
the courts in every case.
Further, following the EEOC guidelines does not require abandoning the standard disparate impact analysis; indeed, the two cannot
112
be separated, as some scholars have argued.
The key point is that,
for the reasons enumerated above, and following a period of public
comment and deliberation, the EEOC determined that English-only
language policies always have a substantial adverse impact on employ113
ees who speak languages other than English.
This, however, is not
the end of the analysis. As with any other practice that has an alleged
disparate impact, if the employer can show a legitimate business ob114
jective (such as safety, as advocated in Spun Steak, or to facilitate su-

109

29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (2008).
See, e.g., Maldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1305 (10th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
111
Cf. Amy Crowe, Comment, May I Speak? Issues Raised by Employer’s English-Only
Policies, 30 J. CORP. L. 593, 602 (2005) (discussing the phenomenon of code-switching,
which suggests that bilingual individuals may not be able to fully control in what language they speak at all times).
112
See Melissa Meitus, Comment, English-Only Policies in the Workplace: Disparate Impact Compared to the EEOC Guidelines, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 901, 913-14 (2007) (seeking to
isolate the EEOC guidelines as employing a separate form of analysis from the disparate impact analysis).
113
See supra Section I.A.
114
See 998 F.2d at 1483 (noting that non–Spanish speaking employees were distracted by the use of Spanish while using machinery, and also claiming that the policy
110

2009] National Origin Discrimination and the EEOC Guidelines

1535

115

pervisor oversight, as advocated in Gloor ), the policy may still stand.
In this way, the guidelines fit within and help define—rather than replace—the burden-shifting format established by Title VII.
The EEOC guidelines on national origin are not just good policy;
they also work well in practice. The district courts, as discussed in Section I.D, have issued several rulings that have used the EEOC guidelines in various ways. Looking at these cases, a few points stand out.
The first is that, in general, the district courts have either granted
some deference to the EEOC guidelines or have at least used the
guidelines to help inform their analyses. This point is seen most
116
clearly in EEOC v. Synchro-Start Products, Inc. and EEOC v. Premier Op117
erator Services, Inc., where the courts specifically stated that the guidelines were due a substantial amount of deference. Even those courts,
however, that did not feel bound by the EEOC guidelines (or that did
not reach a decision as to whether or not they were bound to show
any deference to them), still frequently applied the guidelines to aid
118
119
their analyses.
Only the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Kania
and the two district courts constrained by precedent refused to ac120
knowledge the guidelines as having possible persuasive value.
The
second point is that the presumption in favor of applying the guidelines is not outcome determinative. In only two of the five cases in
which they were considered did the courts rule in favor of the em121
ployees. In the other three cases that applied the guidelines, courts
have found a legitimate business justification for the policies, and
therefore have not found them to be discriminatory; even though the
122
guidelines applied, the outcome remained the same.
Ultimately, it
seems that there has been an increase in the number of courts that
would promote workplace harmony and increase the ability to communicate with factory inspectors).
115
See 618 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir. 1980) (arguing that non–Spanish speaking supervisors would not be able to perform their duties effectively if subordinates were able
to speak Spanish and that customers objected to communications that they could not
understand).
116
29 F. Supp. 2d 911, 913 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
117
75 F. Supp. 2d 550, 556 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
118
See, e.g., Cosme v. Salvation Army, 284 F. Supp. 2d. 229, 240 (D. Mass. 2003).
119
14 F. Supp. 2d 730, 735 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
120
Navarette v. Nike Inc., No. 05-1827, 2007 WL 2890976 (D. Or. Sept. 28, 2007);
Prado v. L. Luria & Son, 975 F. Supp. 1349 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
121
Premier Operator Servs., 75 F. Supp. 2d at 550; Synchro-Start, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 911.
122
Gonzalo v. All Island Transp., No. 04-3452, 2007 WL 642959 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26,
2007); Barber v. Lovelace Sandia Health Sys., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1313 (D.N.M. 2005);
EEOC v. Sephora USA, LLC, 419 F. Supp. 2d 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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are willing to consider the EEOC guidelines and that find them to be
at least persuasive if not binding, but this change has not resulted in a
complete tipping of the scales against the employers. Rather, it has
merely shifted the focus to the business justification proffered by the
employer.
The rationale behind the EEOC guidelines is valid, lending
stronger support to the argument that they should be granted deference. English-only policies are appropriately suited to regulation by a
rule, and the EEOC’s specific guidelines are well supported. In addition, adopting the guidelines would not require a change in the discrimination analysis, but rather would fit within the existing burdenshifting formula. Finally, the guidelines work well in practice and are
not prejudicial to employers. All of this supports granting deference
to the guidelines.
B. A Comparison to Race and Sex Discrimination Claims
It is worth comparing the courts’ treatment of national origin discrimination to their jurisprudence in the realms of race and sex discrimination. In both of these areas, courts have been much more willing to entertain broad statutory readings and to follow the guidelines
issued by the EEOC. Since Title VII lists without differentiation the
bases on which it is impermissible for employers to discriminate, the
courts should interpret each of the provisions similarly and grant the
same breadth to national origin discrimination as they do to race and
sex discrimination.
In the area of sex discrimination, broad readings of the statute are
especially prevalent. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court
found that the ban on discrimination on the basis of sex included a
123
prohibition on sex stereotyping as well.
In that case, a woman was
denied a promotion not solely because she was a woman, but because
124
she was a woman who displayed stereotypically male behavior.
This
reading was endorsed by Congress in the 1991 amendments when it
extended the holding of Price Waterhouse to allow recovery even in
cases where an employer was only partially motivated by an improper
consideration of sex and likely would have chosen not to promote or

123

490 U.S. 228, 250-52 (1989).
See id. at 250 (asserting that “an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a
woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender”).
124
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hire the individual even without the invidious discrimination.
The
relationship between sex discrimination and sex stereotyping claims is
very similar to that between English-only employment policies and national origin discrimination; although not explicitly listed in the statute, English-only policies reasonably fall under national origin discrimination and received an implied endorsement from Congress
126
when the Civil Rights Act was amended in 1991.
The Supreme Court has also held—although there is no mention
of it in Title VII—that sexual harassment falls under sex discrimina127
tion, and it more recently has concluded that even though it “was
assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it
enacted Title VII,” same-sex sexual harassment may also fall under the
128
statute.
Of special interest is the use of the EEOC guidelines in determining the breadth of coverage of sex discrimination. Noting the
relative dearth of legislative history, the court in Meritor Savings Bank,
FSB v. Vinson turned to an extensive discussion of the EEOC guidelines, finding that they fully support the inclusion of sexual harass129
ment as a type of sex discrimination and have done so consistently.
Again, if a similar method of interpretation was applied to a nationalorigin-discrimination claim, there should be no reason to believe that
national origin discrimination could not encompass “language discrimination” claims. While these claims also assuredly are not the
“principal evil” with which Congress was concerned, this does not
mean that Title VII cannot protect them. In fact, the EEOC has consistently held that it does.
Although Title VII does not specifically address discrimination
that focuses on language, the EEOC’s decision to place such conduct
under the umbrella of national origin discrimination is not without
merit. The Supreme Court’s willingness to read Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination broadly and to examine closely the EEOC
guidelines for support should send a message to lower courts to do
the same for national origin discrimination, especially in the face of
130
legislative history that supports such a reading.
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See, e.g., Greenwood v. Stone, 136 F. Supp. 2d 368, 370 n.1 (W.D. Pa. 1992)
(“Section 107 reverses the liability limitations imposed on mixed motive cases by the
decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins . . . .”).
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See supra subsection II.B.1.
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Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-67 (1986).
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Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78-81 (1998).
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477 U.S. at 65-67.
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See supra subsection II.B.1.

1538

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 157: 1513

In addition, the courts have been much more willing to grant deference to the EEOC guidelines in the realms of race and sex discrimination. The Eleventh Circuit, in particular, stated that the EEOC’s
position that employers are liable for the conduct of their supervisory
131
agents was entitled to “great deference” and should be adopted.
Many district courts also have explicitly imported requirements established by the EEOC guidelines. This is most clearly apparent in situations where the employer relies on an entry test to determine employment eligibility, such as those frequently required by police and
fire departments. In these cases, many courts require that the employer conform to the EEOC guidelines to meet its burden of proving
132
that the test is not racially discriminatory.
Most striking, however, is
the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.:
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, having enforcement
responsibility, has issued guidelines interpreting § 703(h) to permit only
the use of job-related tests. The administrative interpretation of the Act by
the enforcing agency is entitled to great deference. . . . Since the Act and
its legislative history support the Commission’s construction, this affords
133
good reason to treat the guidelines as expressing the will of Congress.

If this interpretation is true in the case of the EEOC’s guidelines as
they relate to evaluating tests that have an alleged disparate impact on
racial minorities, there is no reason that it should not also be true for
determining the breadth of national origin discrimination. Given
both the validity of the EEOC’s interpretation and the legislative history discussed above, it is clear that, under Griggs, the EEOC’s guidelines on national origin discrimination should be given deference.
The Supreme Court itself has broadly interpreted sex discrimination in several of its precedents, and courts, including the Supreme
Court, have repeatedly granted deference to the EEOC’s guidelines in
evaluating race and sex discrimination claims. No persuasive reason
exists for not also extending this treatment to national origin discrimination under Title VII.
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Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1559 n.8 (11th Cir. 1987).
See, e.g., Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 371 F. Supp. 507, 515 (D.
Mass. 1974); Vulcan Soc’y of the N.Y. City Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 360 F.
Supp. 1265, 1273 & n.23 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); W. Addition Cmty. Org. v. Alioto, 340 F.
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CONCLUSION
As a policy with solid theoretical and practical applications, the
courts should grant deference to the EEOC guidelines on Englishonly language rules in the workplace. While Gloor began the departure from the EEOC’s interpretation in 1980 and Spun Steak also declined to follow the EEOC guidelines in finding that an English-only
language policy did not constitute an adverse impact, the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Maldonado gives reason to question if the tide might
be reversing. This change would bring the EEOC’s guidelines on
English-only policies in line with administrative law by requiring some
deference for the interpretative rules that the Commission has implemented. Such a move would not only comport with administrative
law, but it would be supported by Supreme Court precedent, congressional history, and the courts’ treatment of similar interpretative rules.
Additionally, the EEOC guidelines are good policy, and their use has
not resulted in any overt favoritism of plaintiffs at the expense of their
employers. Finally, when comparing the breadth of interpretation
and the deference granted to the EEOC guidelines in the areas of sexand race-discrimination claims, it becomes clear that there is no basis
for not doing the same for national origin discrimination.
With the presence of a circuit split and large variance among district courts’ treatment of the issue, it is time for the Supreme Court to
address whether “language discrimination” can fall under national
origin discrimination and what role the EEOC guidelines should play
in this analysis. When examining national origin discrimination, however, it is imperative that the Court remember the purposes of Title
VII—“to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable
134
group . . . over other employees.”
The number of bilingual employees in the workforce is likely to continue to increase rapidly. In addition, the issue of national origin discrimination is likely to become a
hot-button topic in the law in the coming years. With this background, and the strong reliance that bilingual employees especially
place on these guidelines, it is imperative that the courts continue to
recognize the expertise of agencies and allow the EEOC to regulate
national origin discrimination.
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Id. at 429-30.

